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To What Surprises Do Hog Futures
Markets Respond?
Julieta Frank, Philip Garcia, and Scott H. Irwin
We reassess the effect of new information in the Hogs and Pigs Reports (HPR) focusing on
announcements’ rationality and alternative surprises. HPR announcements are irrational
estimates of final estimates, and market expectations are irrational estimates of HPR
numbers. Using the market’s best forecast and incorporating final estimates, we modify
conventional information measures. Despite differences as large as 33 cents/cwt in price
response, findings suggest there is little to differentiate among surprise measures.
Regardless, the message that HPR provides new information to the market is strongly
supported. On balance, marketing (breeding) information has a larger effect on short-term
(long-term) price changes.
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Previous research demonstrates that the hog
futures market responds to information in
Hogs and Pigs Reports (HPR) announce-
ments. However, conflicting findings by Car-
ter and Galopin and Colling and Irwin (1990,
1995) on the economic value of the informa-
tion suggest that uncertainty persists on the
magnitude and importance of the reaction.
This uncertainty is heightened by findings that
announcement effects in agricultural markets
typically are able to explain only small
portions of the variability in subsequent price
changes (Carter; Garcia and Leuthold). Part
of the ambiguity and uncertainty may be
related to the accuracy of the measure of
surprise, or new information, to which the
market responds. In futures markets, conven-
tional procedures examine the effect on price
changes of differences between market expec-
tations and the announcement. However, this
can be misleading when the announcement
does not fully reflect available information,
when the market responds to actual or revised
final values and not just its preliminary
announced value, and when market expecta-
tions are difficult to specify. Simply put,
markets may be interested in the difference
between the true value of a variable and its
own expectations, which are difficult for the
analyst to appropriately quantify. In this
situation, conventional procedures are biased
and can underestimate the intensity of the
market response to new information (Orazem
and Falk).
We examine the response of hog futures
prices to different measures of surprise result-
ing from the HPR announcements. In the
context of the HPR, preliminary breeding and
inventory announcements may not be rational
forecasts of the final revised figures. In a
similar vein, market expectations that have
been measured by an average expectation of
private market analysts of changes in breeding
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they fail to characterize accurately the vector
of dynamic factors affecting market consen-
sus. Using preliminary breeding and market
inventories from the USDA HPR quarterly
report and final revised breeding and market
inventories from the USDA Hogs and Pigs
Final Estimates Bulletins, we investigate
whether the preliminary announcements and
market expectations are rational forecasts for
the period 1982–2002. We then assess the
impact of alternative measures of new infor-
mation from the announcements on hog
futures prices.
Related Literature
Numerous studies have analyzed the impact of
HPR releases on hog futures prices. For
example, Miller studied the adjustments of
live hog futures prices to the release of HPR
farrowing information for the period 1970–
1978. Using a partial adjustment model, he
tests price responses to farrowing information
contained in the HPR. His findings show a
significant response of prices to new farrowing
information, although the response is not
instantaneous. The response of futures prices
is slower for more distant contracts (6–
7 months from delivery) than for nearby
contracts (3–4 months). Hoffman and Hud-
son, Koontz, and Purcell find that hog futures
generally react quickly to new information
contained in HPRs. However, their research
does not use market expectations, meaning
that price responses could be associated with
other sources rather than the information
contained in the HPR.
Colling and Irwin (1990) were the first to
explicitly incorporate market expectations to
assess the reaction of hog futures prices to the
HPR. They use markets analysts’ prerelease
information to measure market expectations
and quantify the effects with a two-limit tobit
model to incorporate the effects of exchange
imposed price limits. For the period 1981–
1988, while considerable noise exists, hog
prices quickly and efficiently reflect available
information on inventories before the release
of USDA reports and only new information
contained in the report after the release. Some
weak evidence of a predictable price pattern
after the USDA announcement was encoun-
tered, but profitable postrelease trading strat-
egies could not be constructed.
Using a different tact, Carter and Galopin
contend that the HPR does not provide new
information. They argue that the HPR has no
economic value because a trader in possession
of information prior to the release of the
report cannot make significant risk-adjusted
profits. They conclude that the market is
highly (semistrong) efficient and able to
incorporate in futures prices the information
in the report prior to its release. In response,
Colling and Irwin (1995) demonstrate that
Carter and Galopin’s findings are highly
sensitive to the risk-discounting procedures
used and that, under a wide range of
reasonable risk premiums, the conclusion that
HPR contains new information holds. To help
further clarify this controversy, Mann and
Dowen (1996) tested the effect of information
arrival from HPR on both price variability
and normalized trading volume. They find
that the HPR does indeed provide new
information to the market, with the reaction
continuing into the second day after the
release for nearby and distant contracts.
Several studies have also shed light on the
pricing process by examining the rationality of
prerelease expectations in livestock markets.
Colling, Irwin, and Zulauf find that prerelease
information is a strong-form rational expec-
tation of breeding and market inventories in
the HPRs. Mann and Dowen (1997) compare
informational content of government (USDA)
and nongovernment (Knight-Ridder [KR]
News Service) reports and conclude that KR
expectations are unbiased and efficient esti-
mates of USDA data.
The accuracy of the government livestock
reports at predicting final inventory estimates
has also been investigated. Meyer and Law-
rence show that for the period 1980–1987,
total market inventories in the HPR do not
significantly differ from their predicted values.
However, using an econometric model and
time-series comparisons, Blanton et al. find
that USDA breeding inventory estimates have
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presents strong evidence that two-quarter-
ahead USDA announcements of sow farrow-
ings intentions are not rational forecasts of
actual farrowings. Later, Runkle (1992) finds
that errors in USDA announcements of sow
farrowing intentions have a predictable com-
ponent but that hog futures prices are efficient
with respect to the farrowing announcements
because they efficiently incorporate the pre-
dictable component prior to the government
announcement of actual sow farrowings. Mills
and Schroeder examine the rationality of the
USDA Cattle on Feed (COF) reports and
conclude that initial estimates are biased, but
the bias is economically small. Revisions of
COF estimates also are not random and
exhibit persistence, suggesting that when
revisions are made, subsequent similar types
of revisions follow. Schaefer, Myers, and
Koontz also test for rationality of COF,a n d
their findings suggest that the information
contained in the report is irrational with
respect to final revised numbers. Further, they
conclude that not recognizing the preliminary
nature of the USDA announcement would
have given very different results about market
efficiency and the ability to predict price
movements after the release of the COF
report.
Hence, research suggests that the HPR
contains new information that is incorporated
in hog futures prices, but some controversy
exists with regard to the magnitude and length
of the effect and the value of the new
information. Further, there is evidence that
USDA livestock reports are not unbiased
estimates of revised final numbers, and this
could influence market reaction and its
measurement. When government announce-
ments do not fully reflect available informa-
tion and the market responds to the actual or
revised value and not to the preliminary
announcement, estimates of its price effects
will be downward biased and inconsistent
because of the errors-in-variables problem
(Orazem and Falk). If this is indeed the case,
this may help clarify the existing uncertainty
about the nature of the market’s reaction to
new information and its value. Here, we
evaluate the rationality of market and HPR
announcements by direct comparison with
USDA revised estimates and then investigate
the market’s reaction to alternative surprises
based on conventional and modified measures
that reflect the effect of revised final estimates
on price response.
Conceptual Framework
HPR announcements are released quarterly
and include total market (MK) and breeding
(BR) inventories. The report contains infor-
mation that is released to the market after the
close of trading on the announcement day.
Subsequent HPR releases include revised
estimates for data already published. Prior to
the announcement, market expectations are
based on private analysts’ surveys that typi-
cally are released after the close of trading
2 days before the HPR is released.
The conventional procedure to measure
new information from the announcement
entering the market is to use the difference
between the information contained in the
announcement and the information known
by the market prior to the release. This
measure is then used to assess futures prices
reaction to the new information in the market.
However, when the HPR numbers are not
rational estimates of actual realized values, the
conventional estimator of the announcement
effect may be biased and inconsistent. In turn,
the wrong sign and significance of relevant
parameter estimates can lead to erroneous
inference regarding the effect of new informa-
tion entering the market (Orazem and Falk).
Under this scenario, the specification of the
surprise measure needs to be reconsidered.
Extending Orazem and Falk’s framework, we
test the impact the release of the report has on
prices using two traditional and two modified
measures of surprise.
Let xa
i , t be the HPR announcement esti-
mate released at day t for BR and MK
inventories and xe
i , t { 1 be the market expec-
tation before the HPR announcement is
released. Further, assume that the HPR
announcement contains irrational estimates
of actual inventories and that other sources
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accurate information become available at a
later period t + n.L e tx
f
i , t be the final revised
estimate for day t that is released at some
future day t + n. Based on this basic structure,
several measures of surprise are developed.
A first measure of surprise is simply the
difference between the announcement and
market expectations and is the conventional
representation of information contained in the
HPR that is unknown to the market,
ð1Þ x
u(1)
i , t ~ xa
i , t { xe
i , t { 1 ,
i ~ BR , MK fg , t ~ 1, :::, T ,
where x
u ( : )
i , t is the unanticipated information.
However, because this information might be
biased with respect to final estimates, we




i , t ~ x
f
i , t { xe
i , t { 1 ,
where x
u (2)
i , t represents the modified conven-
tional measure accounting for final estimates.
The response of prices to this measure might
help identify whether the market is able to
anticipate revisions to the initial HPR an-
nouncements. If the market has this extra
information, then prices should respond to
x
u (2)
i , t .
Under Orazem and Falk’s framework,
alternative surprises are based on different
linear projections of the relevant breeding,
marketing, and expectations variables. When
the market focuses on the announcements of
inventories xa
i , t, the market’s rational prean-
nouncement linear forecasts are the fitted
values from the regression
ð3Þ xa
i , t ~ b0 z b1xe
i , t { 1 z e1i , t ,




i , t ~ xa
i , t { b x x a
i , t ~ e1i , t ,
where b x x a
i , t are the fitted values of xa
i , t in
Equation (3) and x
u(3)
i , t is the linear projection
measure of surprise. However, if the market
focuses instead on the final revised estimate,
then the market’s preannouncement linear
forecast are the fitted values from
ð4Þ x
f 0





i , t { 1 z e2i , t :
After an announcement, the market will
update its information to include xa
i , t so that
the market’s optimal forecast of x
f









i , t { 1 z b2xa
i , t z e3i , t :
In this case, new market information is
ð4:2Þ x
u(4)
i , t ~ b x x
f 0
i , t { b x x
f 00
i , t ~ e2i , t { e3i , t ,
where b x x
f 0
i , t are the fitted values from Equation
(4), b x x
f 00
i , t are the fitted values from Equation
(4.1), and x
u(4)
i , t is the linear projection—final
measure of surprise. When preliminary an-
nouncements are rational, then Equation (3.1)
provides an appropriate representation of the
surprise. However, if government preliminary
announcements are biased estimates of final
inventories, fitted values of Equations (4) and
(4.1), along with Equation (4.2), must be used
to derive the new information conveyed to the
market by the preliminary announcement.
1
Data
Breeding and market inventories are taken
from the USDA HPR. The reports are the
result of surveys to hog producers taken by
USDA, and for most of the previously
mentioned period, they were released quarter-
ly in March, June, September, and December
after the close of trading. From January 2001
to September 2003, reports were released on a
monthly rather than a quarterly basis. Inven-
1Alternative specifications for Equation (4.1)
using lagged values of market expectations and HPR
announcements to allow for a more comprehensive
specification of current market expectations were
examined. Using standard rationality tests described
in the text and statistical criteria, none performed
better than Equation (4.1). These findings for alter-
native market expectations are available from the
authors.
76 Journal of Agricultural and Applied Economics, April 2008tories used in this study are totals of major
states.
2
Actual breeding and market inventories are
taken from the USDA Hogs and Pigs Final
Estimates Bulletins, which are published ap-
proximately every 5 years. Final estimates
differ from the previously mentioned current
estimates in that they make use of additional
information including the Census of Agricul-
ture, slaughter data, shipment records, im-
ports, and exports. The final estimates inven-
tories were matched with their corresponding
current estimates so that current and actual
numbers refer to the same states. The last
available Hogs and Pigs Final Estimates
Bulletin was published in March 2004 and
contains inventories’ final estimates through
2002. Hence, surprise measures defined by
Equations (2), (4), (4.1), and (4.2) can be
computed only for the period 1982–2002.
Market expectations are an average of
about 15 private market analysts’ expectations
reported as changes in breeding and market
inventories from year-ago levels. The analysts’
expectations are released after the close of
trading 2 days before the USDA report is
released.
Open and close hog futures prices from the
Chicago Mercantile Exchange were collected
on days 1 through 4 after the report release.
Two time horizons were defined in order to
capture differences between breeding and
market inventory holders. Distant futures
prices are expected to react relatively more
to breeding inventory announcements because
breeding inventory impacts take a longer time
to affect market supplies. Near futures con-
tracts, in contrast, are expected to react to
market inventory announcements because this
category takes a shorter period to enter the
market. The near and distant horizons were
defined, respectively, as those contracts expir-
ing 2 to 3 months and 7 to 8 months after the
day of the report release.
3 Hog futures
contracts underlying commodity changed
from live to lean hogs in 1996. In order to
develop a standardized series, prices before
1997 were transformed to lean hogs using a
factor of 1.35.
Prior to estimation of the relationships, we
perform the Augmented Dickey–Fuller test
for unit root on all the series used in the
analysis. We find that market expectations are
stationary at the 10% significant level and that
all the rest of the series are stationary at the
5% level with little evidence of any structural
breaks in the series.
Rationality Tests
Rationality means that the information re-
leased at time t equals its expected value at
time t + n given all the information available at
time t. For instance, the rationality condition
for the information contained in the HPR’s
breeding and marketing inventories is
ð5Þ xa
i , t ~ Ex
f
i , t wt j
  
,
where wt is the set of information available on
day t and implies that the estimates for BR
and MK are unbiased and efficient with
respect to the final revised numbers. The




i , t ~ a0 z a1xa
i , t z ui , t :
For the market expectations xe
i , t { 1
  
,w e




i , t ~ a0
0 z a0
1xe
i , t { 1 z u0
it
ð6:2Þ xa
i , t ~ a00
0 z a00
1xe
i , t { 1 z u00
it ,
2The USDA definition of major states has
changed, as some states have experienced a great
expansion of hog production, while others have
become less important in the hog industry. The data
set is composed of 10 states during the period 1982.2–
1996.1 and 17 states during the period 1996.2–2000.4.
Using a similar data set but for the period 1981–1988,
Colling and Irwin (1990) found no bias in the whole
period data when compared to a subset restricted to
have the same number of states.
3Time horizons are not exactly defined because
hog futures contracts do not exist for every month of
the year.
Frank, Garcia, and Irwin: Information Surprises in Hog Futures Markets 77where unbiasedness implies a0 5 0a n da1 5 1.
The tests are performed on both estimates
because we are uncertain whether market
expectations focus on announcements or final
revised estimates. Note that the rationality
tests discussed here are similar to the first step
of the linear prediction framework (e.g.,
compare Equation [3] to Equation [6.2])—in
both cases the objective is to assess the same
systematic error. The efficiency test is a test for
the presence of autocorrelation in the error
terms of the USDA estimates and market
expectations (Equations [6]–[6.2]). A Breusch–
Godfrey LM test for autocorrelation with four
lags to reflect the quarterly nature of the data
is used.
Tests for rationality show that both HPR
and market analysts estimates of breeding and
market inventories are biased and inefficient
with respect to final estimates (Table 1). The
evidence is less strong for HPR market
inventories. Also, market analysts provide
biased estimates with respect to HPR an-
nouncements. The evidence of bias is strong
for both breeding and market inventories and
coincides with Runkle’s (1992) findings for
sow farrowing intentions but contrasts with
Colling and Irwin (1990) and Colling, Irwin,
and Zulauf. However, analysts’ expectations
appear to be efficient with respect to the HPR
for marketing inventories, which is more
consistent with previous research.
4
Market Reaction to New Information
The specification of the model to test the effect
of the surprises on futures prices relies on
institutional features of the futures markets.
Hog futures contracts are subject to daily price
limits of $2 per hundredweight from the
previous day’s closing price. When the price
hits that limit, trades may still take place at
that price, but the free market equilibrium
price is no longer observable.
5
Table 2 shows the number of days that
prices hit the limit during the sample period
(1982.2–2002.4). Approximately 40% of the
prices in the sample are price limits for the first
day after the announcement, limits that might
have important consequences in estimation
and inference if not taken into account
properly. Price limits truncate the distribution
of price changes and make prices less variable.
Therefore, deviations of prices from their
mean values would be harder to detect, and
tests are biased toward nonrejection of zero
coefficients. Price limits may also induce serial
correlation, which would lead to the conclu-
sion that the market is inefficient because
prices do not incorporate all the available
information (Kodres). In order to overcome
these problems and estimate price reactions in
the presence of price limits, a two-limit tobit
model is used in which prices are truncated on
two sides but are allowed to vary freely
between the two limits.
6
The tobit model is estimated for one as well
as for several days after the USDA release.
Tracking price response to new information
over time is significant as an indication of the
speed of market reaction. A significant price
response on the first day after the announce-
ment would indicate that prices react quickly
to new information, whereas significant price
4We also performed the rationality tests using
dummy variables to account for the years in which the
HPR was released on a monthly basis. Both the
unbiasedness the and efficiency tests led to the same
conclusions of irrationality that can be inferred from
Table 1.
5Before 1996 the price limit was $1.50 for live
hogs. Transforming prices using a factor of 1.35 to
make live hog and lean contracts comparable results in
a price limit of $2.025, which is slightly higher than the
$2.00 limit that actually existed in the later period.
This difference should not affect our findings to any
degree, as examination of the results indicated that all
limit observations prior to 1996 are correctly identi-
fied.
6Based on options prices, Egelkraut, Garcia, and
Sherrick identify a procedure to forecast futures price
in the presence of limit moves. While useful in a
predictive context, their framework does not directly
provide estimates of the reaction coefficients between
the change in futures prices and the surprise that is the
primary motivation of the analysis. Future research
that combines their procedure with methods to
identify reaction coefficients may lead to a useful
framework to study price moves in the presence of
limits.
78 Journal of Agricultural and Applied Economics, April 2008responses on subsequent days would indicate
only the degree of delay in prices to incorpo-
rating new information. The effect of 1-day
price changes beyond the first day after the
announcement cannot be directly tested using
this model because price limits appear in a
sequence after the announcement day, and a
limit price following a limit price would yield
biased parameter estimates (Colling and Irwin
1990). Hence, the response of prices in
subsequent days after the announcement is
investigated by cumulating price differences
for each day with respect to the announcement
day. Because prices are permitted to move by
$2 per day, the effective cumulative 2-, 3-, and
4-day price limit is $4, $6 and $8 respectively.
The two-limit tobit price response model is
ð7Þ










MK , t z e
j
t
et * N 0,s2   
Dkpt ~
UL if Dkp 
t § UL
Dkp 
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where Dkpt* are the latent (sometimes unob-
served) equilibrium futures prices in kth differ-
ence form; Dkpt are the observed futures prices
in kth difference form (Dkpt 5 pt,k5k 2 pt,k50, k
5 1 ,...,4i st h ekth day after the
announcement and k 5 0 is the day of the
announcement); x
u( j )
i , t is the unanticipated
information (i.e., measure of surprise to the
market); j 5 1, . . . , 4 are four measures of
surprise defined by Equations (1), (2), (3.1),
and (4.2); d
j
i are estimated coefficients; and UP
and LL are the upper and lower price limits,
respectively(UPis2,4,6,and 8for days1,2,3,
and 4, respectively, and LL is 22, 24, 26, and
28 for days 1, 2, 3, and 4, respectively).
Price changes in Equation (7), Dkpt,a r e
defined in two ways. Consistent with previous
studies we use close-to-close price changes to
measure prices reaction to the HPR report.
However, since the reports are released after
closing on day t, close-to-close price differ-
ences between day t and day t + 1 may contain
both the reaction effect and the effect of other
information entering the market during day t






























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Frank, Garcia, and Irwin: Information Surprises in Hog Futures Markets 79Isengildina, Irwin, and Good, we also use
close-to-open price differences to measure the
immediate reaction of prices when trading
begins after the report is released.
In the presence of heteroscedasticity, the
estimates in Equation (7) are biased and
inconsistent (Hurd; Maddala and Nelson).
Further, Colling and Irwin (1990) point out
that heteroscedasticity has been found in
futures price changes, and therefore some
corrective estimation may be necessary.
Hence, we specify a heteroscedastic tobit
model and then conduct a likelihood ratio
test (LR) to assess whether the difference in
the log likelihood between Equation (7) and
this model is significantly different from zero.
In the heteroscedastic tobit model, the error
term is distributed as in Equation (8), and the
error variance term is assumed to be explained
by the independent variables of the model.
Specifically,




t ~s2 1z exp fBRxu
BR , tzfMKxu
MK , t
     
ð9Þ LR ~{2l n Lr { ln L ðÞ * x2
2 ,
where ln Lr is the log likelihood of the
restricted model in Equation (7) and ln L is
the log likelihood of the heteroscedastic model
represented by Equations (8) and (8.1). LR is
asymptotically distributed as x
2 with degrees
of freedom equal to the number of restrictions
(i.e., 2, fBR 5 0, and fMK 5 0).
7
Hypothesis testing in the tobit model is
performed using likelihood-ratio tests for the
parameter estimates. The null hypothesis for
the announcement effect is that any of the
slope coefficients, dBR or dMK, are equal to
zero. If at least one of the independent
variables (breeding or market inventory) turns
out to be significantly different from zero,
then the information in the USDA announce-
ment is not only new to the market but also
causing a reaction in prices.
The tobit model was estimated for near and
distant contracts and for close-to-close and
close-to-open price changes. To help with
interpretation of the effect of information on
prices, we also estimate the same models in
natural logarithm differences using OLS,
which permits the effects to be expressed as
proportional changes (Greene). To reflect the
censoring, the OLS coefficients are scaled by
1/Tc,w h e r eTc is the number of censored
observations. These response coefficients can
be interpreted directly as the relationship
between percentage price changes in prices
and percentage changes in inventories. For
example, a coefficient of 20.6 would indicate
that for a 1% increase in the unexpected
inventories, prices will decrease by 0.6%.
8
For brevity and ease of interpretation and
because of similarity in the findings, we
present the tobit estimates only for the near-
contract, close-to-close price changes but
provide the OLS estimates for near and
distant contracts and for close-to-close and
close-to-open price changes. Table 3 presents
parameter estimates for the near (2–3 months)
7The model for s2
t in Equation (8.1) is the most
general specification. We also specify linear (i.e.,
s2
t ~ s2 1 z f
0
BRxu


















We choose the appropriate variance model based on
log likelihood, AIC, and BIC measures.
8Estimation of the tobit model using natural
logarithm differences is problematic because the upper
and lower limits will vary with the level of the changes.
Table 2. Number of Censored Hog Futures
Price Observations Following USDA Hogs
and Pigs Reports, 1982.2–2002.4
Day 1 Day 2 Day 3 Day 4
Short time horizon
No. price
limit days 29 8 2 0
Percentage 35% 10% 2% 0%
Long time horizon
No. price
limit days 33 7 2 1
Percentage 40% 9% 3% 1%
Notes: No. price limit days is the number of days prices hit
the limit using close-to-close prices, and percentage is the
proportion of those days in the sample. The total number of
observations for each day and horizon is T 5 83. Days 1 to 4
are the first 4 trading days after the USDA announcement.
80 Journal of Agricultural and Applied Economics, April 2008contracts for Equation (7) and the four
measures of surprise, x
u ( j )
i , t , j 5 1 . . . 4 using
close-to-close price changes. The near- and
distant-contract responses are presented for
both close-to-close and close-to-open price
changes in Tables 4 and 5.
Focusing first on the near-contract, close-
to-close price effects in Table 3, we find
consistent with the literature (Carter) that
the ability of the surprises to explain price
changes is relatively small. Nevertheless, sev-
eral patterns exist. The McFadden R
2sd e -
Table 3. Hog Futures Price Response to the Release of USDA Hogs and Pigs Reports for Near
Contracts, 1982.2–2002.4




0 0.0893 0.0286 0.1008 0.1548
(0.2317) (0.2587) (0.2758) (0.2846)
d
1
BR –0.0045* –0.0063*** –0.0048* –0.0048*
(0.0026) (0.0023) (0.0025) (0.0025)
d
1
MK –0.0010** –0.0010* –0.0010** –0.0009**
(0.0004) (0.0004) (0.0004) (0.0002)
R2
MF 0.12 0.07 0.06 0.05




0 0.3325 0.2429 0.2872 0.3217
(0.2538) (0.2746) (0.2328) (0.2231)
d
2
BR –0.0012 –0.0005 0.0011 0.0011
(0.0021) (0.0023) (0.0024) (0.0024)
d
2
MK –0.0011*** –0.0012*** –0.0016*** –0.0018***
(0.0003) (0.0004) (0.0003) (0.0003)
R2
MF 0.10 0.06 0.08 0.10




0 1.2250*** 1.2299** 1.4687*** 1.4386***
(0.4578) (0.4731) (0.5008) (0.5218)
d
3
BR –0.0068*** –0.0070*** –0.0058** –0.0053**
(0.0022) (0.0023) (0.0025) (0.0025)
d
3
MK –0.0008*** –0.0009** –0.0011*** –0.0010**
(0.0004) (0.0004) (0.0004) (0.0004)
R2
MF 0.09 0.08 0.07 0.06




0 0.3160 0.1941 0.1702 0.2292
(0.2118) (0.2236) (0.2383) (0.2589)
d
4
BR –0.0084*** –0.0086*** –0.0071** –0.0065**
(0.0028) (0.0029) (0.0030) (0.0031)
d
4
MK –0.0009** –0.0010** –0.0012*** –0.0011**
(0.0004) (0.0004) (0.0004) (0.0005)
R2
MF 0.09 0.08 0.07 0.07
LR test 4.80 2.72 1.48 0.36
Notes: Standard errors are in parentheses under the coefficients. The level of significance is indicated at the 10% (*), 5% (**),
and 1% (***) levels. R2
MF is the McFadden’s R
2, which compares the likelihood for the model with intercept only to the
likelihood for the model with the predictors R2
MF ~ 1 { ln LM full ðÞ =ln LM int ðÞ
  
. LR test is the likelihood ratio test for
heteroscedasticity, that is, fBR 5 0a n dfMK 5 0 in Equation (8.1).
{ denotes that the null hypothesis of homoscedasticity can be rejected at the5 % significant level, and estimates of the mean
equation of the heteroscedastic tobit model as described in Equations (8) and (8.1) are reported.
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would expect, because of additional informa-
tion entering the market over time. The
statistical significance of the estimates seems
to be higher for the linear projection surprise
measures, especially for the breeding inventory
coefficients. With regard to heteroscedasticity,
a problem emerges on day 1 with the
conventional model and on days 3 and 4 with
the conventional model using final estimates.
For these cases we report the estimates of the
heteroscedastic model.
A comparison of the coefficients across
cumulative price changes provides important
information about the reaction of prices. For
example, an increase of the slope coefficients di
in absolute value when k, the number of days,
increases would indicate immediate under-
reaction of prices to new inventory informa-
tion. The effects of breeding and marketing
information on price changes differ over time.
For the near contracts, somewhat unexpect-
edly, on day 1 breeding inventories have a
larger effect on prices than marketings for all
surprises except for the conventional—final
measure, where breedings never enter the
relationship in a statistically meaningful way.
Following day 1, the magnitude of the
breedings effect appears to gradually decay,
and marketings have a larger and increasing
effect through day 3 on prices. The relative
importance of marketing and breeding inven-
tories on price changes is consistent with
Colling and Irwin’s (1990) findings, but the
Table 4. Proportional Effect of Percentage Surprises on Percentage Hog Futures Price Changes
for Near Contracts to the Release of USDA Hogs and Pigs Reports, 1982.2–2002.4
Surprise 1-Day 2-Day 3-Day 4-Day
Close-to-close
Conventional BR 20.52 20.49 20.35 20.38
MK 20.39 20.48 20.64 20.60
R
2 0.21 0.22 0.20 0.18
Conventional—final BR 20.13 0.06 0.10 0.08
MK 20.60 20.69 20.87 20.92
R
2 0.19 0.20 0.20 0.23
Linear projection BR 20.51 20.54 20.46 20.45
MK 20.44 20.50 20.61 20.59
R
2 0.21 0.24 0.22 0.20
Linear projection—final BR 20.64 20.61 20.48 20.49
MK 20.46 20.63 20.81 20.74
R
2 0.21 0.26 0.23 0.20
Close-to-open
Conventional BR 20.52 20.48 20.35 20.38
MK 20.39 20.48 20.64 20.60
R
2 0.21 0.22 0.20 0.18
Conventional—final BR 20.13 20.06 0.10 0.08
MK 20.60 20.68 20.87 20.93
R
2 0.19 0.20 0.20 0.23
Linear projection BR 20.51 20.54 20.46 20.45
MK 20.44 20.49 20.61 20.60
R
2 0.21 0.24 0.22 0.20
Linear projection—final BR 20.64 20.61 20.48 20.49
MK 20.46 20.62 20.81 20.75
R
2 0.21 0.25 0.23 0.20
Notes: BR is breeding inventories, and MK is marketing inventories. The surprises are defined in the text by Equations (1), (2),
(3.1), and (4.2). The coefficients are OLS estimates in natural logarithms scaled by 1/Tc, where Tc is the number of censored
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the increase of the marketings effect differ
from their rather stable coefficients over the 4-
day period. For distant contracts, breeding
inventories have large and statistically signif-
icant effects on prices for all days following
the announcement, and marketing inventory
coefficients are small and never appear signif-
icantly at any conventional statistical level.
9
An exception to this behavior is the conven-
tional—final measure, where the breeding
coefficients are not significant but marketing
coefficients appear to be significant at the
5% level for the 4 days after the announce-
ment. Overall, the pattern of price changes
over time provides only modest evidence to
support a contention that the hog market
over- or underreacts to new information in the
HPR.
Evidence from Tables 4 and 5, which
provide reaction responses in percent changes,
suggests that there is little difference between
the close-to-close and the close-to-open esti-
mates. For both the near and the distant
contracts, the corresponding OLS estimates
for the close-to-open coefficients are almost
Table 5. Proportional Effect of Percentage Surprises on Percentage Hog Futures Price Changes
for Distant Contracts to the Release of USDA Hogs and Pigs Reports, 1982.2–2002.4
Surprise 1-Day 2-Day 3-Day 4-Day
Close-to-close
Conventional BR 20.90 20.75 20.73 20.73
MK 20.03 20.16 20.28 20.31
R
2 0.23 0.24 0.24 0.21
Conventional—final BR 20.42 20.35 20.36 20.30
MK 20.44 20.45 20.55 20.67
R
2 0.21 0.22 0.24 0.24
Linear projection BR 20.95 20.84 20.85 20.83
MK 20.08 20.18 20.27 20.32
R
2 0.25 0.28 0.29 0.24
Linear projection—final BR 21.19 20.99 20.98 20.96
MK 20.06 20.28 20.41 20.45
R
2 0.25 0.28 0.29 0.25
Close-to-open
Conventional BR 20.88 20.77 20.72 20.73
MK 20.03 20.17 20.28 20.31
R
2 0.23 0.24 0.24 0.21
Conventional—final BR 20.40 20.36 20.32 20.30
MK 20.44 20.47 20.54 20.67
R
2 0.21 0.22 0.24 0.24
Linear projection BR 20.93 20.86 20.84 20.83
MK 20.08 20.18 20.27 20.32
R
2 0.25 0.28 0.29 0.24
Linear projection—final BR 21.17 21.01 20.97 20.96
MK 20.06 20.29 20.41 20.45
R
2 0.25 0.28 0.29 0.25
Notes: BR is breeding inventories, and MK is marketing inventories. The surprises are defined in the text by Equations (1), (2),
(3.1), and (4.2), respectively. The coefficients are OLS estimates in natural logarithms scaled by 1/Tc, where Tc is the number of
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t , i ~ BR, MK fg , j ~ 1, :::, 4 are the surprise
measures. R
2 is the adjusted R
2.
9This discussion of significance is based on the
tobit results for the distant-contracts, close-to-close
price change which allow for statistical inference.
While inference is inappropriate for the OLS frame-
work, the relative magnitude of the coefficients in the
upper portion of Table 5 provides an approximation
of statistical importance in these tobit findings, except
for the conventional final measure. A complete set of
the tobit results is available from the authors.
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the R
2s are almost identical. Tobit estimates
(not presented) are also practically identical
for the two price changes. The McFadden R
2s
for the tobit models are relatively higher for
the close-to-open models but only marginally
so.
To further assess the sensitivity of our
findings and to identify whether one of the
formulations provides a statistically superior
representation of how new information affects
price, we perform tests for structural change,
allow for differential effects for the period
when the HPR was released monthly, and
assess nonnested dominance. As examination
of the individual series did not identify any
obvious structural breaks, we performed
Chow tests for structural change for two
dates: 1990.4 and 1995.4. The first date
corresponds roughly to when many of the
structural changes in the hog industry were
beginning, and the second reflects the date
when the limit changed from $1.50 to $2.00.
We also assess whether there was a differential
effect for the period the HPR was released
monthly by using dummy variables and
interaction terms with the surprise measures
in Equation (7). More frequent release of the
HPR might be associated with smaller price
changes, as each release presumably provides
less new information to the market. Finally,
we perform bivariate J-tests for the nonnested
models by including the projected value of the
price change for the alternate or rival model.
The battery of tests is performed on the
near and distant contracts. Since there was
little difference between the results for the
close-to-close and close-to-open price series,
we perform the tests on the close-to-close price
series only. At the 5% level, we find no
significant evidence of a structural change or
differential effect for the period when the HPR
was released monthly. Since the analysis spans
roughly two decades during which the hog
industry was undergoing considerable change,
the first finding is a little surprising. It appears
that despite changes in production technology
and marketing/contracting arrangements, the
fundamental relationship between new infor-
mation and its effect on price is rather stable.
The finding may also reflect the difficulty or
imprecision in measuring how daily price
changes are influenced by long-term trends
in the industry. The lack of a differential effect
for the period when the HPR was released is
likely related to data limitations as well. In the
context of our quarterly framework, the
number of observations for this period was
only eight, making it difficult to identify
precise differences in the response coefficients.
Lastly, the bivariate J-tests showed no sys-
tematic pattern of statistical superiority
among the surprise measures. While the
finding may be influenced by the relatively
low power of the test reported in the literature,
it is highly consistent with the similarity in
the response coefficients and similarity of
explanatory power of the different surprise
models.
While statistically there appears to be little
to separate the surprise effects, economic
responses differ across surprise measures.
Linear projection surprises identify generally
larger market price responses than both
conventional surprises. For example, on day
1 the estimate of the breeding inventory effect
on prices using the conventional—final sur-
prise is 20.13, while the estimate using the
linear projection—final surprise is –0.64 (Ta-
ble 4). Using a representative price of $65/cwt,
the linear projection—final surprise would
indicate a 33-cent/cwt larger effect on prices,
based on the difference in coefficients (20.64
and 20.13). The larger responses and higher
statistical coherence identified earlier may
reflect the ability of linear projection proce-
dures to provide a more appropriate measure
of surprise, allowing for a more accurate, less
noisy measurement of the effect of new
information.
Larger response coefficients for the linear
projection—final surprise compared to the
surprise measures provide only modest evi-
dence that Orazem and Falk’s framework,
which highlights the importance of market
participants’ interest in the final revisions, may
be slightly more consistent with the structure
of market information. Despite this modest
difference, the overall similarity in results for
the measures makes it difficult to argue that
84 Journal of Agricultural and Applied Economics, April 2008they are not effectively the same.
10 In Orazem
and Falk’s framework, conventional and
projection surprises provide similar results
when the announcements are rational fore-
casts of the final numbers. In light of the
findings in Table 1 that reject rationality, the
models also provide similar reflections of the
effect of information on prices when expecta-
tions of final and announcements are biased in
a similar manner.
Conclusions and Implications
The effect of the USDA HPR on prices is
complex because the report might not provide
new information to the market or might
provide irrational estimates of subsequent
outcomes and still affect prices. Here we
evaluate the impact of the HPR on hog prices
using four different surprise measures: the
conventional method (announcement minus
market expectations), a modified conventional
method (final minus market expectations), the
linear projection of the conventional method
(error from the regression of announcements
on market expectations), and a linear projec-
tion method that allows for revisions.
We find that HPR announcements are
irrational estimates of final estimates and that
market expectations are also irrational esti-
mates of HPR announcements. These findings
are consistent with the tenor of Runkle’s
(1991) results suggesting that USDA farrow-
ing intention estimates are biased. However,
they differ from Colling and Irwin’s (1990)
and Colling, Irwin, and Zulauf’s rationality
results. Modest statistical differences between
the conventional and linear projection mea-
sures exist. The linear projection measures,
which can reduce the effect of noise on the
estimate, appear slightly more coherent with
the data and provide modestly larger effects of
changes in information on prices. Economic
differences also exist between the conventional
and linear projection measures, with differenc-
es in price response as large as 33 cents/cwt
emerging when comparing coefficients from
the conventional—final measure of surprise to
the linear projection measure that accounts for
final estimates. Regardless of the procedure
used, after the first day of the announcement,
marketing inventory information has a larger
and more consistenteffect on near futures price
changes than breeding inventory information,
which has a larger effect on distant price
changes. These findings are consistent with
CollingandIrwin (1990). Incontrast toColling
and Irwin (1990), we find marginal evidence of
underreaction to marketing inventories in near
contracts and overreaction to breeding inven-
tories in distant contracts. Finally, the rather
small economic and statistical differences
between both linear projection measures sug-
gest that, when similar biases in expectations
and announcements relative to final estimates
exist, the price effects are similar and that little
is gained by focusing on final revised numbers
rather than announcement effects.
Several points emerge from the analysis.
First, while irrationality exists, HPR reports
continue to demonstrate that they provide
information to the market regardless of the
form that is used to measure the effect. While
some differences arise, the overall message is
quite robust and consistent with the past
research that asserts that HPR provides new
information to the market. Second, the source
of the irrationality in forecasting final and
announced estimates is not clear, but because
it emerges regardless of the supply variable
examined, it makes sense to regard a factor
such as a time-varying structural or techno-
10Since we were primarily interested in comparing
the effect of final revisions on price changes, our data
period effectively ends in 2002, the date of the last
final revision available. To gain further insight into
market behavior, we estimate our conventional model,
which does not rely on the final revision data, to assess
the effect of information on prices with data extending
through 2006.1. Since our statistical findings demon-
strated no significant differences among the measures,
this should provide a good approximation of the
market response to new information. For the near
contracts, the breeding inventory coefficients of the
more recent period are slightly larger and a little more
significant, while the marketing inventory coefficients
are lower and less significant. However, the R
2s do not
differ appreciably. The distant-contracts coefficients
show practically no change from those reported in the
text, and the R
2s are almost identical. Overall, these
findings support our discussion in the text regarding
the value of HPR information in the hog market.
Frank, Garcia, and Irwin: Information Surprises in Hog Futures Markets 85logical change in the hog industry as a likely
source. If so, this would argue for the
importance of allocating resources to develop
a better understanding of how structural or
technical change directly affects subsequent
supplies. Such information might permit
market analysts to generate better assessments
of subsequent announcements and final esti-
mates and facilitate a more effective market.
Finally, while we find that new information
does indeed explain changes in prices, consis-
tent with Carter and Garcia and Leuthold, the
degree of explanatory power is relatively
small. This limited ability, even when we allow
for different forms of surprise and market
expectations, in an almost quasi-experimental
market context remains a puzzle. On a positive
note, this may be directing us to other types of
data and analyses, such as the investigation of
intraday price effects following announce-
ments, as research strategies to better under-
stand the effects of new information on
market behavior and performance.
[Received June 2007; Accepted October 2007.]
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